DNS poisoning attack worked even when targets used DNS from Google and Cloudflare.
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Is DNS over TPS using the TPS cover sheets mentioned in the memo?As noted earlier, there are many options for preventing these sorts of attacks beyond (1) eschewing all software that updates unsecurely or (2) using DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TPS.
I suspect that many ISPs don't want you to use encrypted DNS. They want to sell your browsing history. That is much harder when you encrypt your domain names.I think it's reasonable to rename the "Man In the Middle" attack, but would prefer "Malice In The Middle", "Monster In The Middle" or something fun.
Also, I told people to start deploying DNSSEC a dozen years ago, but does anybody listen? Noooooooo....
And how dumb do you have to be to update software over cleartext HTTP?
Presumably an app doing a software update isn't running through the browser, so there would be no such warning.I thought that most web browsers would give you a warning if a site did not have a SSL cert. Did they turn this function off? (I can understand if it is inside your own subnet. Going to an outside site with no SSL and not being told, "You are about to do something stupid." That is irresponsible.)
I believe these updates are downloaded by the applications themselves (e.g., "Update available" prompts inside many apps), not users downloading the updates via a browser.I thought that most web browsers would give you a warning if a site did not have a SSL cert. Did they turn this function off? (I can understand if it is inside your own subnet. Going to an outside site with no SSL and not being told, "You are about to do something stupid." That is irresponsible.)
Yet another reason not to use your ISP’s DNS servers. (As if the standard practice of replacing unregistered domains with pages full of advertising wasn’t enough.)I suspect that many ISPs don't want you to use encrypted DNS. They want to sell your browsing history. That is much harder when you encrypt your domain names.
Even motherboards have been found to update firmware on boot up over cleartext by default. Scary world.I thought that most web browsers would give you a warning if a site did not have a SSL cert. Did they turn this function off? (I can understand if it is inside your own subnet. Going to an outside site with no SSL and not being told, "You are about to do something stupid." That is irresponsible.)
DNSSEC is just signed, not encrypted. If you want encryption you still have to go over TLS (or use DNSCrypt, but that was kind of doomed from day one).I think it's reasonable to rename the "Man In the Middle" attack, but would prefer "Malice In The Middle", "Monster In The Middle" or something fun.
Also, I told people to start deploying DNSSEC a dozen years ago, but does anybody listen? Noooooooo....
And how dumb do you have to be to update software over cleartext HTTP?
Wouldn’t have helped. The issue is the unencrypted-and-un-authenticated nature of DNS; connections to any server could have been hijacked. We really should all move to DoH/T.Yet another reason not to use your ISP’s DNS servers. (As if the standard practice of replacing unregistered domains with pages full of advertising wasn’t enough.)
But of course this is why we can’t have net neutrality. The services ISPs provide on top of just communicating your packets to their distant destination are such a value add.![]()
Search for either MACMA (Mac) or POCOSTICK (Windows) removal instructions. I'm certain there's a security research company or antivirus company that has info on what to do to get rid of them. Probably several of each.What is the recommendation for the end user? Obviously switch to a secure DNS but can anything be done if you are exploited?
I have Unbound running on Opnsense in my firewall, and set up Cloudflare DoT on it, it's working for my whole home network as far as I can tell. I just point Windows to my firewall/router server for DNS and testing on https://1.1.1.1/help confirms it.I just switched from Cloudflare DoH to Unbound which sounds like I could have been vulnerable if my ISP is the unnamed one.
Well, time to look into if Unbound with DoT or DoH is a thing...
Some of it is no doubt laziness, but I suspect in some cases they were trying to avoid the chicken-and-egg problem where a client had expired root certificates, and therefore could not set up a TLS connection to download new ones.And how dumb do you have to be to update software over cleartext HTTP?
DNSSEC does protect against MITM attacks, which is what this attack was, so it would absolutely have helped here.DNSSEC is just signed, not encrypted. If you want encryption you still have to go over TLS (or use DNSCrypt, but that was kind of doomed from day one).
Not to say that a fair number of ISPs don't want to tamper with your DNS results.
[On edit: Obviously I replied to the wrong post. This was supposed to be in response to Ralf The Dog]
Thank you very much.Search for either MACMA (Mac) or POCOSTICK (Windows) removal instructions. I'm certain there's a security research company or antivirus company that has info on what to do to get rid of them. Probably several of each.
Doesn’t apt default to HTTP? I thought you had to install an extension to apt to get HTTPS transport.I think it's reasonable to rename the "Man In the Middle" attack, but would prefer "Malice In The Middle", "Monster In The Middle" or something fun.
Also, I told people to start deploying DNSSEC a dozen years ago, but does anybody listen? Noooooooo....
And how dumb do you have to be to update software over cleartext HTTP?
apt uses additional GPG checksum to guarantee authenticity. You technically lose privacy (so if you download… uh, sketchy packages your ISP and your cafe wifi owner can see that) but it still provides strong secure guarantees.Doesn’t apt default to HTTP? I thought you had to install an extension to apt to get HTTPS transport.
You have more faith in the average software hawker than I do. I suspect they did not think that far ahead, period.Some of it is no doubt laziness, but I suspect in some cases they were trying to avoid the chicken-and-egg problem where a client had expired root certificates, and therefore could not set up a TLS connection to download new ones.
That's true but it still comes up. In the last decade or so I've twice had to deal with issues involving either root CA certs expiring, or the intermediate certs of issuers expiring.The expiration thing doesn't hold water anyhow. It's your own software doing the update. You can use whatever root cert you want, including one you create yourself, with as long an expiration time as you want. Which is actually what you should be doing; there's no reason to expose your updates to the public CA infrastructure. Although if you did, you probably still wouldn't have an expiration problem, because all their root certs have really long lifetimes.
Unbound can use DoT fine. Thats why I used it for a resolver for a while.I just switched from Cloudflare DoH to Unbound which sounds like I could have been vulnerable if my ISP is the unnamed one.
Well, time to look into if Unbound with DoT or DoH is a thing...
... except that I know when my own root will expire, and I can easily make it a very, very long time. I don't have to interoperate with anybody.That's true but it still comes up. In the last decade or so I've twice had to deal with issues involving either root CA certs expiring, or the intermediate certs of issuers expiring.
If your update infrastructure relies on TLS, you essentially have to hope people run software updates during the time between the new cert being issued and the old one expiring. If not, they're out of luck and will never get another update.
Apt optionally uses it. It’s not part of the .deb, it’s part of the indexes fetched over http; if the MITM blocks the PGP signed files, it can fall back to unsigned files. It’ll warn (and block by default) an unsigned updated, but it’s user configurable. Users aren’t too great when faced with things like that, which is why browsers make it much harder to bypass certificate errors now.apt uses additional GPG checksum to guarantee authenticity. You technically lose privacy (so if you download… uh, sketchy packages your ISP and your cafe wifi owner can see that) but it still provides strong secure guarantees.
But I definitely feel like every once in a while this topic gets brought up, since HTTPS does provide additional layer of guarantees, including privacy and more. I think they use HTTP to allow caching (which I'm not sure if it still matters much today).
Yeah it's definitely laziness. I distribute an open source Mac app and uses the widely used Sparkle updater. It's pretty common to use HTTPS to distribute update files since a lot of times the files are hosted on some external CDN anyway and the entire western web uses HTTPS these days (you can't even browse the web or download these apps if your root certs are so expired). Even then we would have an additional signature that only we have control over that the updater uses to check to guarantee authenticity. This makes sure we have control of the update process and no one else can masquerade a fake update binary.... except that I know when my own root will expire, and I can easily make it a very, very long time. I don't have to interoperate with anybody.
Or, for that matter, if I really had a desperate reason not to use TLS, I could just sign the file itself. I should probably doing that anyway. If I do that, I can just require version N+1 to be signed with whatever key is hardwired into version N, and ignore the expiration date in the cert, if there even is a cert.
In no case do I have to download an unsigned file over a non-integrity-protecting protocol and run that file.
I'd vote for "and" rather than "or"...As noted earlier, there are many options for preventing these sorts of attacks beyond (1) eschewing all software that updates unsecurely or (2) using DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TPS.
I have Unbound running on Opnsense in my firewall, and set up Cloudflare DoT on it, it's working for my whole home network as far as I can tell. I just point Windows to my firewall/router server for DNS and testing on https://1.1.1.1/help confirms it.
I think it's reasonable to rename the "Man In the Middle" attack, but would prefer "Malice In The Middle", "Monster In The Middle" or something fun.
Also, I told people to start deploying DNSSEC a dozen years ago, but does anybody listen? Noooooooo....
And how dumb do you have to be to update software over cleartext HTTP?